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THE ROAD NOT TAKEN:
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT SANCTIONS AND
GRAND JURY PRESS LEAKS
James W. Fox, Jr.*
In August of 1984, the New York Times printed an article
concerning the federal grand jury investigation of Washington,
D.C. mayor, Marion Barry. The story stated that "[flederal
law-enforcement officials familiar with [the] testimony"
disclosed information regarding the mayor's denial of alleged
cocaine use.' The article also indicated that a law enforce-
ment officer revealed details of the direction of the investiga-
tion.2 The article, and similar pieces in other national
newspapers,3 indicated possible violations by the federal
prosecutors of the rule against disclosure of grand jury
information, Rule 6(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 4 The story also potentially created public preju-
dice against Barry which could have affected the grand jury or
a future petit jury. At the very least, it could have created
public bias and disrespect toward the mayor, prior to any
indictment, which would have inhibited the execution of his
duties as a public official.
This Note examines the appropriate judicial responses to
such news stories, focusing on the options available to counsel
for the target of a grand jury investigation5 who is affected by
the leaked information. Part I explains why dismissal and
quashing are extremely difficult remedies to obtain, why
* Editor in Chief, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 23,
1990; A.B., University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 1986; J.D., University of
Michigan Law School, 1990; Clerk, The Honorable Phyllis A. Kravitch, United States
Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, 1990-91; Associate, Covington & Burling,
1991-present. I am grateful to the following for their patience, advice, and editorial
efforts: Professor Jerold Israel, Tom Byrne, Mark Rose, and Rob Borthwick.
1. Leslie M. Werner, Mayor of Washington Is Subject of Perjury Inquiry by
Grand Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1984, at Al; see also Barry v. United States, 865
F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
2. Werner, supra note 1, at A16.
3. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1320 (summarizing the various articles).
4. Id. For the relevant portion of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2),
see infra text accompanying note 8.
5. Throughout this Note, I refer to targets and targets' counsel. The discussion
also applies to any other person affected by the press leaks, including people already
indicted by the grand jury. When the fact that a person has been indicted may alter
the applicable issues, the Note includes a relevant discussion.
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internal investigations by the government are inadequate, and
why, therefore, contempt sanctions are presently the most
viable legal response to such leaks. Part II describes the
general contours of both criminal and civil contempt actions
and reviews specific applications of civil contempt actions in
grand jury leak cases. Part III questions the functional and
theoretical validity of civil contempt actions in leak situations.
It argues that a civil contempt action is proper when the court
seeks an affirmative act from the contemnor, but not in a
press leak situation where the intended result is inaction
through the cessation of future leaks. Part III demonstrates
that this theoretical tension produces practical hazards and
concludes that the criminal contempt sanction, which punishes
past press leaks, is a superior sanction. Finally, Part IV
proposes methods to be used in a criminal contempt action.
I. REMEDIES FOR RULE 6(E)(2) VIOLATIONS
The Supreme Court has recognized "that the proper func-
tioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings."6 Secrecy preserves the willingness of
witnesses to come forward and testify truthfully, reduces the
risk that persons to be indicted will flee, and ensures that
persons investigated but not indicted will not be subject to
public ridicule.7 Rule 6(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure codifies the required grand jury secrecy. It provides:
A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator
of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded
testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person
to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of
this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these
rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any
person except in accordance with this rule. A knowing
violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of
court.'
6. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979).
Protection of grand jury secrecy by the courts is rooted in well-established common-
law traditions. See id. at 218 n.9.
7. Id. at 219.
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) includes within the scope of
subsection (2) any government personnel brought into the investigation.
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As the Supreme Court has stated, two of the important
reasons for the grand jury secrecy secured by Rule 6(e)(2) are
protecting the reputations of the unindicted and preventing
the influencing of prospective petit jurors.9 These harms are
most likely to occur when the leak of grand jury information
becomes public knowledge. This is why leaks to the press,
such as those in Mayor Barry's case, are so threatening to the
grand jury process and why courts are concerned about such
leaks.1° Furthermore, although leaking grand jury informa-
tion to the press1' clearly violates Rule 6(e)(2), it is far less
clear how a court or someone affected by the leak should
respond.
A. Dismissal and Quashing Remedies
When confronting such a leak, counsel for a target initially
might be tempted to seek the quashing of a subpoena or
dismissal of the grand jury rather than contempt sanctions;
the prospect of ending the investigation of one's client appears
more enticing than simply obtaining an action against the
prosecutor or other government official. Because of an
unwillingness to interfere with the grand jury investigation, 12
however, courts have imposed severe roadblocks to intrusive
forms of relief such as motions to quash or dismiss.
The primary difficulty for a target seeking dismissal or
quashing is the requirement that she demonstrate prejudice. 3
9. Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 219; see also In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance
v. United States), 610 F.2d 202, 213 (5th Cir. 1980). Both Douglas Oil and Lance
involved the former version of Rule 6(e), wherein the current Rule 6(e)(2) was then
Rule 6(e)(1). Although the subsection numeration was different, the text was
identical. See 610 F.2d at 217.
10. See Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1555-56 & n.11 (11th Cir. 1988)
(Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (citing Douglas Oil and discussing the importance
of secrecy expressed in Rule 6(e)(2)); In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F.
Supp. 1188, 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (citing Douglas Oil and Rule 6).
11. It is not the purpose of this Note to consider why leaks to the press occur.
Whatever the causes, this Note assumes that such leaks will continue to occur. An
inquiry into the reasons behind such leaks, however, provides an interesting
perspective on the relationship between the press and government prosecutors. See
Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 865, 889-91 (1990), and materials cited therein.
12. See Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that
the district court should seek to avoid relief that would interfere with the grand jury
proceedings).
13. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:2
In establishing that requirement, the Supreme Court applied
the harmless error standard to Rule 6, holding that a district
court may not dismiss an indictment for errors arising under
Rule 6 unless such errors prejudice the defendant. 4 It is
unlikely, however, that the release of the information alone
will have prejudiced the target before the grand jury because
the information is already before the grand jury, independent
of the leak. Therefore, the target must demonstrate both
evidence of the leak and that the generally negative press
engendered by the leak biased the grand jurors. Given that
grand jury proceedings are secret and that indictments are
presumed valid if they are valid on their face,'5 the target
stands little chance of proving bias sufficient for a showing of
prejudice.
The Supreme Court did, however, provide a small opening
for counsel to sustain a prejudice argument by demonstrating
prosecutorial misconduct. If the defendant can demonstrate
that the prosecutor's misconduct infringed upon the grand
jury's independence or that this misconduct continues a
history, over several cases, of similar errors, then she might
be able to support a claim of prejudice or the denial of
fundamental fairness.'6 Given the difficulty of collecting
evidence of press leaks 7 and of investigating a history of
prosecutorial misconduct," such an avenue to a showing of
prejudice is remote."
14. Id.
15. Id. at 261 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45 (1974)).
16. Id. at 259; see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 15.5, at 106-07 (Supp. 1991).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 81-91.
18. For example, in the context of the impermissible use of peremptory strikes
by a prosecutor to dismiss jurors on the basis of race, the Supreme Court has
declared that the proof of a history, over several cases, of such actions amounts to "a
crippling burden" for the party alleging misconduct. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 92 (1986). Batson is admittedly an extreme example. Someone trying to uncover
proof of racial motivation in past jury selections will probably have little objective
evidence, whereas someone trying to prove past leaks to the media can at least comb
old newspaper articles. Nonetheless, the general point still applies: requiring a
showing of prosecutorial misconduct over several cases only compounds the proof
problems inherent in such cases. The problems that a target has compiling
information about leaks in her own case will multiply when she is required to gather
information from several other past cases with which she is unfamiliar and which
were not investigated for leaks at the time.
19. Indeed, to prove prejudice, targets will likely have to rely on evidence of
misconduct in addition to leaks to the press. United States v. Kilpatrick is a rare
example of a case where the district court found misconduct partly as a result of
leaks. 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1346 (D. Colo. 1984). Yet, even that dismissal was based
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In addition to the problem of showing prejudice, courts,
which are loath to interfere with the grand jury, have imposed
a high burden of proof on those seeking remedies that intrude
on the grand jury.20 The target must show that the state-
ments concerned "matters occurring before the grand jury" and
that the source was covered by Rule 6(e)(2). 21 Courts inquire
very closely into the particularity of the evidence, especially
the specification of the source of the leak. Whereas reference
to "government sources" in a press article may constitute
sufficient cause for a contempt hearing, 2 a dismissal motion
requires greater specificity.23 Reporters, however, rarely
provide more specific information regarding their sources.
24
It is therefore unlikely that a target can prove a Rule 6(e)(2)
violation with enough particularity to sustain a motion to
dismiss.
Several factors support this reluctance to grant relief that
intrudes on the grand jury. The defendant will have a full and
fair consideration of his case at trial, which could remedy the
possible prejudice caused by the leak. Fear of prejudice in the
on several incidents of misconduct, id. at 1351-53, including the improper disclosure
of information by the prosecutor to the IRS, the use of information by that agency,
and the improper restriction of witnesses. Id. at 1345-47. When the case was
appealed to the Supreme Court, even with evidence of misconduct beyond the leaks,
the Court still held that dismissal of the indictment was inappropriate. Bank of Nova
Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988).
Quashing of subpoenas, like dismissals of indictments, is also rare. In a case
involving leaks to the press, the evidence of leaks was not enough to support a motion
to quash. In re Archuleta, 432 F. Supp. 583, 597-99 (S.D.N.Y.), reconsidered on other
grounds, 434 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Moreover, as with the dismissal remedy,
to obtain a quashing remedy a target will likely need to demonstrate additional
prosecutorial misconduct, such as attempting to deceive the court and the other
party. See, e.g., In re Kiefaber, 774 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated and dismissed
as moot, 823 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (describing a case in which a
prosecutor leaked information to local law enforcement agencies and concealed
important information from the target and the court; although the case was vacated
as moot, it provides an example of the type of additional misconduct courts may
require to quash a subpoena).
20. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance v. United States), 610 F.2d 202,
219 (5th Cir. 1980).
21. Id. at 216-17.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 81-91.
23. See In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury (Scott v. United States), 587 F.2d
889, 892 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148, 1155 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 348-50 (3d Cir. 1980)
(describing a case in which a reporter endured contempt penalties in order to protect
the confidentiality of her source and information), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
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petit jury can be cured in voir dire. 25 Acquittal would pre-
sumably cure a grand jury defect which impairs the validity of
the indictment, while a conviction provides an opportunity to
raise prejudice on appeal. Additionally, a target may be told
to wait until an indictment is handed down and to challenge
the indictment instead of the grand jury, because the grand
jury will have valid reasons for indicting which are distinct
from the influence of the Rule 6(e)(2) violation.26 Finally,
courts also may be reluctant to provide a target or defendant
the benefit of such drastic relief because they view such relief
as a "windfall"27 absent sufficient prejudice to the target.
B. Internal Investigations and Discipline
Rather than quashing or dismissing an indictment, a court
could require the internal investigative branch of the prosecu-
tor's office to look into the matter and respond with internal
disciplinary actions against the offenders or present the
evidence of the leak to the court for further action. A federal
district court in Michigan adopted this approach when
confronted with possible leaks by the U.S. Attorney's Office in
an investigation of Mayor Coleman Young and other Detroit
officials.28 In that case, the court determined that newspaper
articles indicated a possible Rule 6(e)(2) violation. The court
required an internal inquiry into the prosecutor's responsi-
bility for the leak.2" Although the court specifically reserved
a threat of a contempt action against the prosecutor's office, it
did not institute such an action.3" Instead, it asked the
Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility
to investigate the leak and report its findings to the court.3
The district court in the City of Detroit's case reasoned that,
because some of the news reports were inaccurate, further
25. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 16, § 15.5, at 330 (1984).
26. The Rule 6(e)(2) violation does not affect the grand jury's decision to indict
because the information leaked was already known to the grand jury; FED. R. CRIM.
P. 6(e)(2) covers only "matters occurring before the grand jury."
27. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988); see also
United States v. Myers, 510 F. Supp. 323, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
28. In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188, 1212 (E.D. Mich.
1990).
29. Id. at 1211-12.
30. Id. at 1207.
31. Id. at 1212.
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investigation of the leak was necessary before the court could
respond, and it viewed the Justice Department as the appro-
priate investigative agent.32 Although such a solution was
certainly within the district court's power33 and may have
been proper in that case, the court's decision raises potential
difficulties which could be avoided by moving directly to a
contempt investigation.
An internal investigation will likely only complicate resolu-
tion of the leaks because it places the agency already sus-
pected of misconduct in charge of presenting the court with
evidence of the misconduct. Even though the Office of
Professional Responsibility operates somewhat independently
of the U.S. Attorney's Office, both are under the supervision
of the Attorney General's Office.34 At the very least, this
connection produces an appearance of bias. In the worst
situation, it enables the Justice Department to cover up the
misconduct. Even if the Justice Department institutes
internal disciplinary actions, the public and the target may not
discover the source or the full extent of the leaks.
The danger that the government may not publicly release
information about the leaks is the most compelling reason for
avoiding the type of resolution sought in the City of Detroit
case. Although the district court may have viewed an internal
investigation as more reasonable under the circumstances
than a contempt investigation,35 its response ignored the
public rights and values at stake. The court sought to
investigate a violation of a federal rule governing court
procedure, not a breach of Justice Department policy.36 The
Rule protects public and judicial values, including the rights
32. Id. at 1211-12.
33. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988)
(identifying internal discipline by the Justice Department as one of several responses
to a Rule 6(e)(2) violation).
34. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.39-0.39e (1991) (Office of Professional Responsibility); 28
C.F.R. § 0.5 (1991) (Attorney General's Office). These regulations assign the Office
of Professional Responsibility authority to conduct internal investigations, but
nonetheless state that primary responsibility for investigating misconduct remains
with the head of the department in which the questioned official works. 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.39d (1991).
35. The district court may also have succumbed to the courts' traditional
reluctance to employ contempt sanctions against prosecutors. See BENNET L.
GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 13.3 (1991) (observing that despite the
appropriateness of a contempt sanction in responding to misconduct, few judges
impose the penalty).
36. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188, 1198-1202,
1207-12 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
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of witnesses and targets, and the integrity of the grand jury
process.37 Although the prosecutor and Justice Department
also protect the public, when the prosecutor's office is sus-
pected of the violation, no division of the same agency should
retain authority over the investigation. Otherwise a cloud
could remain over the investigation and any subsequent
response.
In addition, it is important to remember that Rule 6(e)(2)
itself specifies that contempt sanctions are appropriate
punishment for a violation of the Rule.3" Although courts
have discretion in how to respond to a leak, the exercise of
that discretion in response to a violation should be guided by
the Rule itself.39 The Rule does not say that the violation
should be investigated by the office or agency responsible for
the violation, nor does it request that the court merely inquire
into the matter. Rather than requesting an internal investiga-
tion, the district court could have initiated a contempt
investigation. When, as in the City of Detroit case, there is
evidence of a Rule 6(e)(2) violation and also some evidence to
the contrary, the more effective avenue would be to assign a
special prosecutor, independent of the U.S. attorney, who
could pursue and evaluate the evidence without a possible bias
in favor of the suspected violator.
The Supreme Court has recommended the use of private
attorney prosecutors, reasoning that "[i]f the Judiciary were
completely dependent on the Executive Branch to redress
direct affronts to its authority, it would be powerless to protect
itself if that Branch declined prosecution."4 ° The fear that
the Executive Branch would fail to prosecute becomes espe-
cially acute when it is asked to prosecute itself. The contempt
action provides the proper mechanism for a court to "protect
itself" when confronted with a leak.41
37. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1979).
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
39. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are the strongest authority
governing grand jury leaks. See 8 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE $ 1.02 (2d ed. 1983) (stating that, as to federal courts, the Rules have the
force and effect of statute and supersede all laws in conflict with their provisions).
Professional ethical codes, however, can provide some additional guidance for a judge
because some codes prohibit extra-judicial speech by attorneys regarding an ongoing
case. See generally Matheson, supra note 11, at 872-77 (discussing the various forms
of ABA model ethical rules on extrajudicial lawyer comment).
40. Young v. United States ex. rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987).
41. For a suggested method which a special prosecutor can follow in a criminal
contempt investigation, see infra Part IV.
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C. Contempt Sanctions
Were drastic measures such as dismissal the only enforce-
ment mechanisms for Rule 6(e)(2) violations, courts might be
more inclined to employ them. When refusing to dismiss,
however, courts often refer to the less intrusive response of
contempt sanctions. One district court declined to quash a
subpoena but stated that "[t]he remedy for improper disclosure
of grand jury evidence is to punish the offending party in a
contempt proceeding."4 2 Even where the court acknowledges
the misconduct of the prosecutor, it frequently will deny
dismissal and suggest contempt sanctions or censure.43 The
Supreme Court expressed its approval of this approach in
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States.44
Though courts have not, to the best of my knowledge from
reported cases, applied contempt sanctions for press leaks,
several courts have considered the possibility of doing so. In
the leading case, the Fifth Circuit ordered the district court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not to
impose contempt sanctions on the prosecutor.45 In Mayor
Barry's case, the D.C. Circuit demanded a similar hearing.46
More recently, in the case involving Detroit Mayor Coleman
Young and Chief of Police William Hart, the district court
ordered the Department of Justice to conduct an inquiry into
possible press leaks by the U.S. attorney and report its results
to the court, leaving open the option of contempt sanctions or
other action.47  Significant questions remain, however,
concerning the nature of and the procedures for implementing
these potential contempt sanctions.
42. In re Archuleta, 432 F. Supp. 583, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 510 F. Supp. 323, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
44. 487 U.S. 250 (1988). The Court stated that a contempt sanction was a more
adequate remedy than dismissal because it responds to the specific problem of
misconduct without a windfall to the defendant. Id. at 263; see also GERSHMAN,
supra note 35, at § 13.3 (arguing that contempt actions "may be the most efficient
method for dealing with misconduct").
45. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance v. United States), 610 F.2d 202, 207,
220-21 (5th Cir. 1980).
46. Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1325-26 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
47. In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188, 1212 (E.D. Mich.
1990).
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II. CONTEMPT AND GRAND JURY LEAKS:
THE CURRENT LAW
Although several federal courts have considered contempt
actions for violations of grand jury secrecy and press leaks,
there is no consensus on whether the actions should be civil or
criminal.4" Confusion over the proper form of action in a leak
situation is due partly to the historical intermingling of the
two actions.49 Nonetheless, they are distinguishable.
A. Civil and Criminal Contempt
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt has
engendered much confusion; ° even those not so baffled have
sometimes suggested that courts and legislatures dispense
with the distinction.5 Despite this confusion and criticism,
however, courts have retained the two forms of action. 2
Because questions concerning the proper procedure, the right
to appeal, and the appropriate sentence hinge on the distinc-
tion, how courts treat contempt in a grand jury press leak
situation has significant consequences for resolution of
Rule 6(e)(2) violations.
48. Compare Barry, 865 F.2d at 1321 (holding that civil contempt action was
proper) and Lance, 610 F.2d at 212 (5th Cir. 1980) (same) with Blalock v. United
States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1552 (11th Cir. 1988) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (arguing that
criminal contempt action was proper) and In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2),
748 F. Supp. 1188, 1198-1204 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (same).
49. The seminal case discussing the distinctions between civil and criminal
contempt is Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). The Supreme
Court there acknowledged that the distinction is tenuous. Id. at 441. Subsequent
case law, although reiterating the distinctions made in Gompers, has not eliminated
confusion. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1966); United States
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 297 n.64 (1947). See generally Joseph
Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 780
(1943) (discussing confusion between criminal and civil contempt); Douglas C.
Berman, Note, Coercive Contempt and the Federal Grand Jury, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
735, 739 (1979) (stating that the "evolution of law in this area was often haphazard
and doctrinally weak"). The most contested issues between civil and criminal
contempt involve matters of procedure and appealability. OWEN M. Fiss & DOUG
RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 866 (1984).
50. See supra note 49.
51. See, e.g., Robert J. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion
Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 687-88, 705 (1981).
52. The authority for contempt actions rests in 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
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The core of the distinction rests in the purpose of the
"punishment"; that is, what the court intends to accomplish.53
Punishment is actually a tricky term in this context. Although
the term might indicate criminal contempt specifically,
"'punishment' as used in contempt cases is ambiguous,"54 and
does not clarify the difference between civil and criminal
contempt. This ambiguity stems from the fact that, in either
a criminal or civil contempt case, the sentence can appear to be
punishment: the contemnor can be fined or imprisoned for
failing to obey a court directive. Thus, as the Supreme Court
stated eighty years age, "[i]t is not the fact of punishment but
rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish
between [civil and criminal contempt sanctions]."55
If the punishment, by either fine or imprisonment, is
intended to compel action, then the contempt action is civil.5"
A contempt sanction which seeks to have the defendant testify
or turn over documents is civil because the court tries to
compel the defendant to act in the future in accordance with
the law, a court rule, or a court order.57 Civil contempt
sanctions, therefore, are frequently employed to compel
compliance with an injunction.58
Criminal contempt sanctions, on the other hand, are more
directly connected to the usual conception of punishment: the
court punishes the defendant for having violated a law, court
rule, or court order.59 In addition, the judge hopes to deter
similar future actions by the violator or others; however, the
53. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Berman, supra note 49, at 737-39.
54. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 297 n.64 (1947).
55. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441.
56. See id. at 441-42.
57. See id. at 442.
58. An extreme and controversial example of this occurred in the Yonkers low-
income housing dispute. When the city council failed to adopt legislation creating
low-income housing as had been ordered by the district court, the court held the city
in contempt for $100 on the first day, doubling the fine each day the city failed to
enact the legislation. It also fined and threatened to imprison the recalcitrant city
council members. United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 450-52 (2d Cir.
1988) (affirming and modifying in part the district court's opinion). The Supreme
Court reversed this latter sanction, holding that contempt sanctions against the
council members should have been considered individually by the district court only
after contempt sanctions against the city proved to be ineffective. Spallone v. United
States, 493 U.S. 265, 279-80 (1990).
59. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-44 (1911); see
also Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 235
(1971).
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specific reason for the contempt sanction is a response to a
past act with no requirement of affirmative future conduct."0
The type of punishment imposed clarifies the distinction. If
the court conditions the penalty on the defendant's compli-
ance, the contempt penalty is civil;"1 the defendant is said to
hold the keys to his own cell because his choice to comply will
release him. 2 If the punishment is for a fixed period and is
not conditioned on the contemnor's future actions, then the
contempt penalty is criminal6 3  If, however, the fixed term
of imprisonment is conditioned on a future action of the
contemnor, it is simply a civil contempt penalty with a
maximum imprisonment period which applies as long as the
contemnor refuses to comply with the court's order.6 4
In addition to the nature of the punishment, the benefit
received from the two forms of contempt sanctions is also
important. A civil contempt sanction remedies a wrong to
individuals or private parties, and its benefits flow to those
persons specifically.65 Criminal contempt sanctions, like
criminal actions generally, protect the public interest, and it
is the public which reaps the benefits.6 6
The choice between designating a contempt action as civil or
criminal determines the procedural rules that govern the
action. Civil contempt actions operate under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, while the Federal Rules of Criminal
60. See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443 (stating that deterrence may be an incidental
benefit of criminal contempt sanctions).
61. Not all civil contempt penalties are designed to coerce behavior. Sometimes
a civil contempt penalty in the nature of a fine will serve compensatory or remedial
functions. See Berman, supra note 49, at 737. Because there may be no direct
financial losses involved in a leak of grand jury information, remedial civil contempt
penalties would be difficult to use in a leak situation. See infra text accompanying
notes 137-39.
62. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442. The origin of the concept of having the keys to
one's cell is not entirely clear. See Susan B. Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual
Abuse, and the Legal System: Beyond Contempt, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 502 n.45
(1989) (suggesting a possible origin for the phrase).
63. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442.
64. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1966). As was the case
in Shillitani, civil contempt penalties for a fixed period are often applied in cases
where a grand jury witness refuses to testify. The fixed term must not be for longer
than the term of the grand jury for which the testimony is needed. Id. at 371.
Congress has limited the period of confinement in recalcitrant witness cases to the
lesser of the life of the court proceeding, the term of the grand jury, or 18 months.
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1826 (West Supp. 1992).
65. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance v. United States), 610 F.2d 202,
221 (5th Cir. 1980) (Kravitch, J., dissenting); 8B JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 9 42.02[2] (2d ed. 1991).
66. See Lance, 610 F.2d at 221.
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Procedure govern criminal contempt proceedings.67 A civil
action is more favorable for the party raising the action because
civil contempt actions permit broad discovery and the proceed-
ings are largely controlled by the complaining party's pleadings.
The complainant also benefits from the fact that the defendant
in a civil action retains fewer procedural protections: there is
no right to a jury trial;68 proof must be clear and convincing
instead of beyond a reasonable doubt;69 and the violation need
not be willful.7 ° Criminal contempt actions, on the other hand,
are initiated by a court,7 may be prosecuted by a federal or
special prosecutor, 72 and the defendant receives most criminal
procedure protections, including the right to a jury trial.73
Thus, the contemnor will benefit more from the procedures in
a criminal contempt action, although the prospect of a criminal
sanction may be far more frightening.
B. Civil Contempt and Grand Jury Press Leaks:
The Current Law
In the leading case regarding grand jury press leaks, the
court asserted that the purpose of the proceeding was clearly
67. For a full description of civil and criminal contempt procedures, see 3
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 705 (civil contempt),
§§ 709-12 (non-summary criminal contempt) (1982) and 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2960 (1982) (enforcing
injunctions by contempt citations). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a) permits
summary criminal contempt proceeding, which does not retain the normal criminal
procedures, when the contumacious conduct is committed in court. FED. R. CRIM. P.
42(a). Rule 42(b) insures the right to notice and hearing for criminal contempt
actions other than those under subsection (a) and affords other criminal procedure
rights to an accused criminal contemnor. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). There is no
counterpart to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 regarding civil contempt
proceedings in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
68. Berman, supra note 49, at 739; see also Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S.
364, 371 (1966) (stating that civil contempt proceedings can be held without the
safeguard of a jury).
69. See 3 WRIGHT, supra note 67, § 705.
70. Id.
71. See id. § 710.
72. Id. § 711.
73. The right to a jury trial in criminal contempt actions was secured in Bloom
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198-200.(1968). Much earlier, the Court recognized that a
defendant in a criminal contempt action was presumed innocent, that guilt must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the defendant cannot be compelled to
testify against himself. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444
(1911). See generally 3 WRIGHT, supra note 67, § 711-12 (discussing criminal con-
tempt procedures); Dobbs, supra note 59, at 242-43 (same); Berman, supra note 49,
at 738-39 (same).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:2
remedial and, therefore, the action was appropriately charac-
terized as civil. 74 The court provided no authority supporting
its determination, but instead proceeded to outline the proper
procedures and analysis for a civil contempt action in a grand
jury press leak case.75 Although some appellate judges have
spiritedly argued that criminal contempt is the proper
characterization in such cases, each of the appellate courts
which have confronted the issue have decided that civil
contempt is the proper designation.76
The procedure established in Lance consists of several stages.
First, the party alleging a violation must establish a prima
facie case that Rule 6(e)(2) was violated.77 The accused party,
that is, the prosecutor, then may present evidence rebutting
the presumed violation v.7  This is often done with affidavits
of denial, which the prosecutor may present before or after the
prima facie showing.79 Naturally, the prosecutor maintains
a stronger strategic position with early submission of affida-
vits; judges may reward accommodating prosecutors and
punish the delinquent. Finally, if a prima facie case exists and
the prosecutor fails to respond, admits the violation, or
otherwise does not satisfy the court, the judge then conducts
an evidentiary hearing regarding contempt sanctions."0
1. The Prima Facie Case-The most difficult aspect of
this process for the target may be constructing the prima facie
case. He must establish both that the leaked information
consisted of "matters occurring before the grand jury" and that
74. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance v. United States), 610 F.2d 202, 212
(5th Cir. 1980).
75. Id. at 212-21.
76. The appellate courts have followed Lance in the following cases: Barry v.
United States, 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d
1546 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1983).
Certain judges have disagreed with Lance, either in dissents or concurrences. See
Barry, 865 F.2d at 1326 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1552-53
(Tjoflat, J., concurring); Lance, 610 F.2d at 221-28 (Kravitch, J., dissenting). One
district court has agreed with these dissenting views. See In re Grand Jury
Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188, 1195-1206 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
77. Lance, 610 F.2d at 216-19.
78. Id. at 219.
79. Id. at 219-20.
80. Id. at 220-21. I assume that nowhere in this process will target's counsel be
able to obtain information from the press. Although the press has no privilege
against testifying, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972), reporters will
often refuse to reveal their confidential sources. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note
16, § 15.5 n.58.
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the source was a person covered by Rule 6(e)(2). 8' Because
the target seeks contempt sanctions rather than dismissal,
however, the court will probably not require as particularized
a showing as it would in a dismissal action.82 For example,
the Lance court did not require a particularization of the
source. Instead, it permitted the substance of the information
leaked to play a part both in the proof of the "matters occur-
ring before the grand jury" and the proof of the source." The
court, in effect, created a nexus between the two prongs, so
that if the information found in the newspaper was so specific
that it could only have originated with a Rule 6(e) source, the
target need not identify a specific source. Thus, a general
statement such as "sources close to the investigation report"
could be sufficient for a prima facie case if the information is
specific.84 The Lance court found that one article which
described testimony the grand jury was about to hear, named
the witness being called, and described a specific question the
witness would be asked constituted evidence of a violation,
even though the source reference was merely "sources familiar
with the investigation." 5
The complainant may also avail himself of the full collection
of media reports. As Judge Clark said, "[t]he precise attribu-
tion of a source in one or more articles may give definition to
a vague source reference in others because of their context in
time or content."8 6 A statement in one article, which may not
be attributable to a specific source by itself, might still support
the prima facie case when combined with other such state-
ments. The complainant must therefore comb carefully all the
news reports once he suspects that leaks are occurring.
Courts may also prefer targets to present evidence in several
stages in an effort to resolve the leak without resorting to
contempt actions. Prior to the contested contempt motion in
Lance, Lance had already complained to the court that
information was being leaked. On the first such complaint,
the court ordered that, inter alia, all grand jury papers be filed
in camera and that the prosecution institute procedures with
81. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
82. Courts generally require very specific evidence of a leak in order to support
dismissal. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
83. See Lance, 610 F.2d at 218.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 218 n.12.
86. Id. at 219.
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the grand jury and within the Department of Justice to prevent
future leaks. s7 When these efforts failed and additional
articles appeared disclosing more information, Lance com-
plained to the court and informally requested a "show cause"
hearing for possible contempt sanctions against government
attorneys."8 The court sternly admonished the U.S. attorney,
but did not rule on the alleged Rule 6(e) violations.8 9 It took
yet another round of press leaks and a filed motion for sanc-
tions for the district judge finally to examine the articles and
rule on the Rule 6(e)(2) violation.9 ° This example demon-
strates how a court may prefer alternative methods of providing
secrecy, and how the target may wish to present evidence of
the leaks to the court gradually in order to build the prima
facie case against the prosecutor.91
2. Government Affidavits-Once the target has made a
prima facie case, the prosecutor may respond with affidavits
discussing the violation.92 This response is crucial. The Lance
court stressed the failure of prosecutors to deny a violation as
a primary reason for requiring further proceedings.9 3
Some confusion exists regarding when the affidavit should be
submitted in relation to the contempt hearing. In the D.C.
Circuit, once the prima facie case is made, the court must hold
a show cause hearing at which the government defends itself
with affidavits or other means, such as evidence of an ongoing
Justice Department investigation of the leak, and shows why
contempt sanctions are inappropriate.94 In the Eleventh
Circuit, the government presents its affidavits before the con-
tempt hearing.95  The affidavits are presented in camera.9"
87. Id. at 207-09.
88. Id. at 209. The request came in the form of an unfiled motion attached to the
complaint letter sent to the district court for in camera consideration. Id. No formal
motion for sanctions was filed at this point.
89. Id. at 210.
90. Id. at 210-11. The court denied relief and Lance appealed. Id. at 212.
91. A district court in Michigan, in the grand jury case involving Mayor Coleman
Young, followed a path similar to the Lance district court. Even though the court in
Young's case believed that leaks had occurred from within the government's offices
and that there had been similar leaks in another case, it did not apply contempt
sanctions. Instead, the court ordered the Department of Justice to investigate and
report its findings to the court. In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp.
1188, 1212 & n.34 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
92. Lance, 610 F.2d at 219-20.
93. Id. at 220.
94. Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
95. United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959, 964 (11th Cir. 1983).
96. Id.
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If the court feels that a violation has occurred, then the target's
counsel receives the names of the violators and assumes the
role of civil complainant at the contempt hearings. 7
The opportunity to request affidavits may have desirable
benefits for a target, beyond forcing the prosecutor to actually
admit to a violation. It is possible that the court would
require a spate of affidavits covering everyone from the U.S.
attorney, to the grand jury, to anyone in a department related
to the investigation, such as the FBI and the SEC.98 It may
also require an internal Justice Department investigation.99
The burden placed on the government and its embarrassment
before the judge, can result in a tactical advantage, even if no
contempt is ultimately found. Additionally, even if the
government submits affidavits denying any leaks, Lance left
open the option for the court to hold a contempt hearing based
on the news reports, in spite of the affidavits.
100
3. The Evidentiary Hearing-Both the Barry and Lance
courts remanded their cases so that the district courts could
hold evidentiary or show cause hearings.' 0 ' Unfortunately,
my research has revealed no published description of any
evidentiary hearings on contempt sanctions for a leak to the
press, either in those cases or any others. Such a hearing,
however, raises significant questions engendered by the
conflict between civil procedure rules and the secrecy of the
grand jury. These important questions require some discus-
sion of the possible nature of evidentiary hearings in these
cases.
A target wields a potentially powerful sword in civil discov-
ery. The liberal discovery of civil procedure would theoretically
enable counsel to depose government agents, request broad
document production, and submit interrogatories. Were the
full panoply of tools applied to the contempt action, counsel
97. Id. at 965.
98. See United States v. Marcello, 508 F. Supp. 586, 596-97 (E.D. La. 1981)
(noting that the court requested an additional Justice Department report even after
receiving affidavits from seven government attorneys), affd, United States v. Roemer,
703 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983).
99. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188, 1212 (E.D.
Mich. 1990); In re Archuleta, 432 F. Supp. 583, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
100. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance v. United States), 610 F.2d 202, 221
(5th Cir. 1980).
101. Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Lance, 610 F.2d
at 207.
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could divert the prosecutor from the underlying investigation
and obtain information regarding the scope and direction of
that investigation. For example, if the target obtains a list of
all the government investigators involved with the grand jury,
he could anticipate the scope of the investigation.
10 2
The danger of abuse will probably encourage most courts to
restrict discovery. A court's interest in protecting the contin-
ued secrecy of the grand jury supports some limitation on
discovery; the contempt action itself should not subvert the
secrecy rule it seeks to enforce.' 3 The limitation should be
designed to prevent interference with the grand jury investiga-
tion and protect its secrecy. Yet, the court should not prevent
all possible discovery, as that would rob the action of its civil
character. A reasonable solution is to permit written interrog-
atories which could help determine what specific depositions
or document requests might uncover the sources of the
leaks.'04
The extent of the discovery may not include the target's
receipt of a list of names of all the government officials
involved in the investigation. The Eleventh Circuit, in United
States v. Eisenberg, ruled that the lower court erred in
demanding that the prosecutor turn over such a list directly
to the target's counsel. 5 Such information may reveal
investigatory secrets or endanger witnesses. The appellate
court observed that the district court could demand the list for
in camera review as part of the affidavit review.0 6
The Eisenberg case perhaps should be limited to the
discovery allowed at the affidavit stage. The contempt action
102. See United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959, 965 (11th Cir. 1983).
103. Courts may limit discovery if it would frustrate the underlying purpose of the
proceeding. See 4 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T 26.51 (2d
ed. 1984).
104. See United States v. IBM, 60 F.R.D. 650, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (limiting IBM's
discovery to interrogatories and narrow document requests); see also United States
v. Julius Doochin Enters., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 942, 945 (M.D. Tenn. 1973) (requiring
the government witness to respond to some, but not all, of the contempt defendant's
deposition questions). It should be noted that in these cases the government was the
complainant. It could be argued that the target's status of seeking contempt
sanctions rather than defending against the action would justify greater discovery
because the government possesses all the information. Alternatively, it could be that
the target deserves less discovery since he is not the one facing severe sanctions.
Without precedential guidance, how specific courts will weigh this factor can only be
a matter of speculation.
105. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d at 964.
106. Id. at 965.
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in Eisenberg had not progressed to an evidentiary hearing.'0 7
It is possible that the target's rights as a civil litigant might
not attach until the evidentiary hearing. A court might wish
to restrict discovery prior to the evidentiary hearing, but then
broaden discovery once it believes that the case is serious
enough to warrant the hearing. If so, then perhaps the list of
government officials would constitute permissible discovery.
The need for broader discovery prior to the hearing is particu-
larly important in light of the "clear and convincing" standard
of proof generally required of plaintiffs in civil contempt
actions.' 8 Because it is unlikely that the target/plaintiff can
obtain information from reporters,'09 restriction of the
target's discovery from the government, which possesses the
information necessary to prove contempt, virtually ensures his
failure to meet a clear and convincing standard. Given the
tension between the target's need for discovery to prove his
case and the continuing need for secrecy of the grand jury
information, courts should permit broad discovery but screen
all information requested by the complainant, as was done in
Eisenberg.
Another question created by the application of civil proce-
dure rules to a grand jury secrecy issue is whether the hearing
should be open. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(5)
permits a court to close a hearing concerning a possible
violation of Rule 6(e)(2) "to the extent necessary to prevent
disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury.""0
Depending on the extent of the right to an open hearing in the
first place, the authorization of Rule 6(e)(5) for closed hearings
could permit the court to close the entire hearing.
In the context of civil contempt, it is not clear whether there
is a right to an open hearing at all and, if so, who possesses
the right. Although the Supreme Court held in In re Oliver
that a defendant has a right to an open hearing in the
criminal contempt context,"' it has not ruled on whether
107. Id.
108. The clear and convincing standard of proof has traditionally applied to civil
contempt actions. See 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 67, § 2960 at 591; Moskovitz,
supra note 49, at 818-19.
109. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance v. United States), 610 F.2d 202,
219 (5th Cir. 1980); see also supra note 80.
110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(5).
111.. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-73 (1948).
524 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:2
this right extends to civil proceedings. As the Second Circuit
noted, however, the contempt sentence at issue in Oliver was
conditioned on the defendant's actions-a civil contempt
characteristic-and that circuit had no problem extending the
right to a civil case. 112 Yet, even assuming that this exten-
sion to civil cases is permissible, it may be possible for the
defendant to forfeit the right to an open hearing by failing to
request one." 3  In a press leak case it is unlikely that the
defendant, usually a U.S. attorney, will desire an open hearing
during which the misconduct of her staff could be subjected to
public scrutiny. Thus, if the right to an open civil contempt
hearing belongs to the defendant, that right might be waived.
It is possible that the target would desire an open hearing,
especially if he wants to clear the public air after the unfavor-
able press caused by the leaks.114 Because the right to an
open hearing originates in the defendant's due process
rights," 5 however, the target may not possess a comparable
right. Given the authorization of closed hearings in
Rule 6(e)(5), the general need for secrecy regarding grand jury
information, and the fact that the right to a public hearing lies
with the defendant, it is unlikely that the target can demand
a public hearing against the defendant's wishes.
A third advocate of an open hearing could be the press.
Based on the First Amendment," 6 the press does possess
such a right in criminal trials." 7 A criminal contempt
112. In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1982).
113. See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 618-20 (1960). Levine was
decided prior to the Court's determination that serious criminal contempt required
a jury trial. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198-200 (1968). The continued
vitality of Levine's holding that a defendant can waive a public contempt trial by not
so requesting has not been tested in the Supreme Court.
114. The target may react ambivalently to an open hearing even if he has the
option. Although he will want to elicit the sympathies of the press and the public by
demonstrating the prosecutor's misbehavior, the target does not want to risk having
the government release information adverse to him. For instance, the government
could call a former grand jury witness to testify at the contempt hearing. Grand jury
witnesses have no secrecy obligation. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) advisory
committee's note. The witness may then say that she released the information to the
press, which clears the government of the charge, and in so doing divulge evidence
of unseemly or illegal actions by the target. The contempt hearing may thus be too
slippery an eel for the target's counsel to control.
115. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 272-73.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
117. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1980). Justice
Stewart would have extended the right to civil trials. See id. at 599 (Stewart, J.,
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hearing, however, falls just short of a criminal trial in terms
of constitutional protection."' Because the press only has
a right to attend "criminal trials,""9 it may not possess a
right to attend either civil or criminal contempt trials. 120
Should the judge permit an open hearing, she would then
need to focus on the language of Rule 6(e)(5) to guide the
proceeding; she would have to determine what closing the
hearing "to the extent necessary" 121 meant in that specific
case. It is possible that the contempt issue would be suffi-
ciently distinct from the underlying investigation that no
"matters before the grand jury" would be divulged in the
hearings, and thus there would be no need to protect secrecy.
Such would be the case when the sole question at the con-
tempt hearing was the identity of the wrongdoer, rather than
what other information was known or leaked. The court can
open the hearing to consider that information, even if evidence
requires closing part of the hearing. 22
4. Civil Contempt and the Right to Appeal-In addition
to these procedural characteristics, another notable aspect of
civil contempt actions concerns the right to appeal. Both the
Barry court and the Lance court held that the denial of a civil
contempt motion is appealable.'23 They reasoned that such
a denial could not receive adequate review later because the
subsequent criminal trial would so obscure the contempt issue
as to make it meaningless. 124 They also found that because
the alleged violation was capable of repetition, delayed review
concurring).
118. See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610,616 (1960) ("Procedural safeguards
for criminal contempts do not derive from the Sixth Amendment. Criminal contempt
proceedings are not within 'all criminal prosecutions' to which that Amendment
applies.").
119. Richmond Newspapers involved only the question of press access to trials,
and although there was no majority opinion, at least five justices discussed the case
in terms of criminal trials. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (opinion
of Burger, J.); id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring).
120. The drafters of Rule 6(e)(5) specifically cited the fact that Richmond
Newspapers covers only 'trials" to support the constitutionality of the Rule's
limitation of the open hearing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(5) advisory committee's note.
121. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(5).
122. The Second Circuit has, in the context of civil contempt for refusing to supply
subpoenaed evidence, required the reopening of the hearings after the grand jury
matters had been discussed. See In re Fula, 672 F.2d 279, 283 (2d Cir. 1982).
123. Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1324-25 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Grand
Jury Investigation (Lance v. United States), 610 F.2d 202, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1980).
124. Barry, 865 F.2d at 1324-25; Lance, 610 F.2d at 213.
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would permit continued harm.125  The decision to deny a
civil contempt motion was thus final and appealable under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.126
When the complainant is a target, there may indeed be no
opportunity to appeal a denial of a civil contempt motion at a
later date. If the target is not indicted, his avenue to later
appeal in connection with the indictment will be lost, while
the injury from the media leak may remain. Because the
possibility exists that a target will not be indicted, the order
should be appealable.
Additionally, the underlying purpose of civil contempt
proceedings supports appealability. Because civil contempt
sanctions are designed to compel action, which in this situa-
tion means preventing leaks, once the trial is over, no need for
civil contempt sanctions exists. This is why a person found in
contempt is released at the end of the underlying dispute.
127
It would not make sense to appeal the denial of a civil
contempt motion at the end of the underlying case; even if the
denial of a contempt motion were overturned, the prosecutor
would not be held in civil contempt because the underlying
action would have ended. Were the purpose of civil contempt
proceedings purely punishment, then post-trial appeal would
be legitimate. But once the court and target choose civil
contempt proceedings, punishment is not, supposedly, the goal.
Therefore, denial of a civil contempt motion warrants immedi-
ate review. 1
28
If, however, the district court finds civil contempt, the
decision is not appealable. An order finding a party in civil
contempt is considered interlocutory and appellate courts will
not take the appeal for fear of interfering with the proceedings
below. 129  Generally, if the contemnor wants to appeal, he
must comply with the order and appeal afterwards.13 °
125. Barry, 865 F.2d at 1324-25; Lance, 610 F.2d at 212.
126. Barry, 865 F.2d at 1324; Lance, 610 F.2d at 212. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 states that
the "courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts of the United States .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
127. See supra note 64.
128. By way of contrast, it should be noted that a denial of dismissal of an
indictment based on a violation of Rule 6(e) is not appealable immediately, and may
or may not be appealable after conviction. See Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United
States, 489 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1989).
129. See Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936); IBM v. United States, 493
F.2d 112, 114-15, 117-19 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974).
130. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,293-94 (1947);
IBM, 493 F.2d at 119.
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Although this general rule has not been tested in the context
of grand jury press leaks, it is unlikely that courts would find
contempt orders appealable in such- a case.
III. RECONSTRUCTING CONTEMPT ACTIONS
FOR GRAND JURY PRESS LEAKS
The application of civil contempt proceedings in grand jury
press leak situations, despite its current acceptance, remains
theoretically and practically problematic. The theoretical
complications stem from the conflict between the purposes of
the civil contempt action and its use to combat leaks. Simply
stated, civil contempt actions require an affirmative act from
the contemnor, while in a leak situation the court is actually
seeking to prevent action. Additionally, civil contempt actions
secure private rights, while the enforcement of grand jury
secrecy is a public right. These conflicts produce practical
problems in the administration of the contempt action,
including the two extremes, recidivism and impossibility of
enforcement. This Part discusses these problems, and argues
that a criminal contempt proceeding is the more appropriate
response.
A. The Hazards of Civil Contempt Actions
A substantial problem with applying civil contempt actions
to leak situations is the impossibility of assuring compliance
when compliance means inaction. As discussed above, a civil
contempt action generally seeks to compel a future act, such
as the production of documents or testimony.' 3' The key
words in this definition are "future" and "act." In the case of
grand jury leaks, the court seeks two things: punishment for
past leaks and prevention of further leaks. Regarding the
punishment of past actions, a civil contempt sanction is
inappropriate because it applies to future actions; criminal
contempt sanctions are proper for past misconduct.'32
131. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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As for the prevention of future leaks, a civil contempt action
might initially appear quite proper because civil contempt
applies to future actions and the court seeks the prospective
relief of preventing more leaks. This approach was followed
by Judge Edwards in the Barry case.133 He argued that the
relief sought was plainly prospective: Mayor Barry wanted to
stop future leaks, not punish prosecutors for past misconduct.
He therefore found the proper contempt action to be civil.
13 1
Such reasoning ignores the totality of a civil contempt
sanction: it not only operates prospectively, it also compels an
affirmative act. This is why it is particularly appropriate for
compelling the production of evidence. The contemnor
possesses the option of a discrete act to indicate compliance.
In the case of a violation of grand jury secrecy, however, the
contemnor cannot act so as to define the moment of compli-
ance. A prosecutor who is held in civil contempt in order to
prevent future leaks is at a loss to comply.
1 35
If the court tries to avoid this problem by holding the
prosecutor in contempt until she remedies the past leak, there
is still little she can do. The harm done by the press' publica-
tion of secret information cannot be undone. Once the
information is out, it cannot again become secret. The only
possible remedy is compensatory; the court could demand that
the prosecutor pay a fine to reimburse the opposing party. A
civil contempt fine, however, must compensate an actual
loss. 36 In the context of civil contempt, a remedial fine
generally compensates a specific financial loss rather than a
133. Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
134. Id. In an apparent effort to buttress this point, Judge Edwards observed that
both parties recognized the action to be civil. Id. This point was simply irrelevant.
The fact that the parties stipulated to civil contempt does not make civil contempt
the correct action. A lower court's characterization of a contempt action as civil has
no bearing on the appellate court's resolution of the civil or criminal distinction, see
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369 (1966), and neither should the
characterizations of the parties.
135. The Supreme Court has found that, in the event that it is impossible for a
person to comply with a civil contempt order, the contempt sentence should be lifted.
See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 72 (1948). The Court in Maggio was referring to a
situation where the order required a positive act, such as turning over documents,
which the contemnor could not perform because he did not possess the materials.
Although in a press leak situation the problem is the proof of compliance rather than
the ability to comply, impossibility should still render the civil contempt ineffective
because, as the Court stated, "to jail one for a contempt for omitting an act he is
powerless to perform would ... make the proceeding purely punitive, to describe it
charitably." Id.
136. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947).
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vague, nonpecuniary loss. 137 The loss asserted by the target
in a leak situation, a loss to reputation, is not financial and is
not easily converted to a monetary amount. Although the
target may be able to maintain a libel action, it would be
improper to convert a civil contempt proceeding into a wholly
different civil action for libel.'38 Additionally, the purpose of
using contempt actions in leak cases-avoiding interference
with the grand jury investigation" 9-would be defeated if
the contempt action became a fully litigated libel action.
A third alternative is for the court to require a promise by
the contemnor to stop any future leaks, thereby converting the
requirement of inaction into the demand for a positive act.
This option, however, only recharacterizes the prosecutor's
original duty under Rule 6 as a court injunction and as such
will only delay the question of enforcement. As Judge Tjoflat
realized, a required promise to prevent leaks cannot insure the
end of the leaks. 4 ° If the prosecutor is herself the source of
the leak and admits as much, the judge can find her in
contempt until she promises to stop leaking information.
Presumably the prosecutor will do so immediately, ending the
contempt. But what if the leaks continue? Does the judge
again find the prosecutor in contempt until she promises to
stop? The circularity of the process betrays the lack of true
deterrence and, therefore, portrays the inadequacy of civil
contempt sanctions.
137. If the damage or harm being compensated is financially discernible,
compensatory sanctions are appropriate. See, e.g., McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.,
336 U.S. 187, 193-95 (1949) (imposing a civil contempt fine to compensate workers
for wages unpaid due to violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and a prior court
order). On the other hand, when the harm, even if financial, is too vague to provide
a discernible amount for damages, a civil contempt fine is not proper. See, e.g.,
Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467, 471-72 (2d Cir. 1958)
(Hand, J., concurring) (stating that the use of a civil contempt fine to compensate for
harm to a company's good will was improper because the lost profits, though real, were
too vague to ascertain; criminal, not civil, contempt sanctions would have been proper).
138. See, e.g., Northside Realty Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348,
1355-58 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that a compensatory civil contempt action is not the
avenue for a claim which is properly a class action).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 20-27, 42-44.
140. See Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1559 (11th Cir. 1988) (Tjoflat,
J., concurring). This was a peculiarly structured opinion. With one of the panel
judges recusing himself, the other two filed a per curiam opinion applying the civil
contempt procedures created by Lance, 610 F.2d 202. Both judges concurred,
however, stating that Lance was wrongly decided and that the contempt action
should be criminal. Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1552-53. Since the panel was bound by the
precedent, they could not overturn it; only the circuit sitting en banc could do so.
Id. at 1552-53 n.2.
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The only possible situation where a civil action might
succeed is where the court demands that the name of the
Rule 6(e)(2) violator be submitted to the court by the prosecu-
tor. If the prosecutor fails to do so, she may be held in
contempt. The court, by demanding a positive act, can achieve
concrete compliance, so the civil contempt action is appropri-
ate. Unfortunately, this option also only delays the original
problem. Once the court knows the actual violator, it must
still -fashion a workable contempt order, and it again confronts
the ineffectiveness of civil contempt actions.
One judge has suggested that a civil contempt action in a
leak case is improper because the interest being protected-
grand jury secrecy-is public rather than private and, there-
fore, should be prosecuted as a criminal action.' 4 ' It is
generally true that civil contempt actions protect private
interests and criminal contempt actions protect public inter-
ests. 42 This observation, however, proves too much. In the
grand jury context, the use of contempt penalties always
protects a public interest. When a contempt sanction is
employed to compel a witness to testify, it is the public's
interest in prosecutorial effectiveness which justifies its use.
In such a situation, however, a civil contempt action is entirely
appropriate.' Thus, as applied to grand jury issues, the
distinction between civil and criminal contempt actions hinges
more on the "future act"/"past act" distinction than on the
public/private interests at stake.
B. The Proper Remedy:
Criminal Contempt Sanctions
If the court demands a promise from the prosecutor to stop
leaks each time there is a leak and yet the leaks continue, the
141. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance v. United States), 610 F.2d 202,
222 (5th Cir. 1980) (Kravitch, J., dissenting). "Public" in this context encompasses
the interests of future witnesses and persons other than the complaining target. Fear
of witness intimidation is substantial in the context of grand jury leaks. See, e.g.,
United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959, 965 (11th Cir. 1983) (reporting that in the
course of the investigation, an attorney had been threatened and a witness had been
killed).
142. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
143. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); see also Berman,
supra note 49, at 740-42 (discussing the historic use of civil contempt sanctions
against recalcitrant witnesses).
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court may become frustrated with the broken promises. At the
point of frustration, the court may decide to confine the
prosecutor for the remainder of the grand jury term-a
decision based on the contemnor's combined past misconduct
of leaking information and violation of a promise not to leak
further. Such a response by the court would be akin to
criminal contempt sanction, being a punishment for a past
action rather than an effort to compel future acts. 44 The
penalty is criminal, in effect if not in name.
Alternatively, the court could try to enforce a civil contempt
sanction by establishing a prospective fine to charge the
contemnor each time a new leak occurs.'45 However, this
may also be unworkable because the court will need to
investigate each purported leak to determine whether it was
a violation of Rule 6(e)(2) and to determine who was respon-
sible. Once the individualized investigation occurs, the civil
fine would simply operate like a criminal contempt fine for
past conduct.
146
The reality that a civil contempt sanction in a leak situation
will, in effect, serve as a criminal contempt sanction undercuts
the legal validity of the civil action. 14' Because a civil action
contains few of the procedural safeguards of a criminal
action, 4 the civil action deprives a contemnor of constitu-
tional procedural rights and may result in an invalid contempt
citation. 149
144. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1560 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). But see id. at n.20
(stating that a court may not use civil contempt actions to impose a criminal
contempt penalty).
145. This method was proposed by the City of Detroit, but rejected by the district
court. In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188, 1204-05 (E.D.
Mich. 1990).
146. Id.
147. The problem of having a civil contempt sanction function as a criminal
contempt sanction is also apparent in a situation where it is impossible for the
contemnor to comply with the order. This can happen when the contemnor does not
possess the thing which the court's order demands that he produce, such as
documents, see Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 72 (1948), or a dependent child in a
custody dispute, see Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Contempt
Confinement: The Terminally Stubborn Contemnor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185,
190-91 (1991). In either case, because the civil contempt sanction cannot compel the
intended action, it operates only as a punishment. See Maggio, 333 U.S. at 72; see
also Rendleman, supra, at 190-91.
148. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text; see also 3 WRIGHT, supra note
67, § 705.
149. See United States v. Blalock, 844 F.2d 1546, 1560 n.20 (11th Cir. 1988)
(Tjoflat, J., concurring).
532 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:2
The purpose of a civil contempt sanction is to compel an
action; it does not prevent leaks effectively because inaction is
required. 150  Criminal contempt sanctions, however, serve
both to punish past conduct and to deter future similar
conduct.' 5 ' This is precisely what is needed to respond to a
press leak which violates Rule 6(e)(2). In such cases, the court
has before it evidence of a past leak, constituting a violation of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the court wants
to deter future leaks. A court's effort to use a civil contempt
sanction merely creates a paper tiger.152 Criminal contempt
sanctions avoid the judicial frustration of issuing an injunction
and having no further recourse when it is violated.
The secondary purpose of criminal contempt sanctions-
deterrence-is particularly important in this analysis. In the
Barry case, Judge Edwards presumed that a civil contempt
sanction was appropriate because the relief sought was
prospective. 53  This reasoning fails to take account of the
total impact of a criminal contempt sanction. Both civil and
criminal contempt sanctions have a prospective element: civil
contempt sanctions compel a future act and criminal contempt
sanctions deter future acts. Criminal contempt sanctions are
intended to instill enough fear into the contemnor that she will
not act in the same way. In effect, criminal contempt sanctions
can achieve what civil contempt sanctions cannot: inaction. As
inaction is exactly what the court seeks in the leak situation,
criminal contempt sanctions are the proper response.
These practical and theoretical justifications for employing
criminal contempt sanctions for a violation of Rule 6(e)(2)
receive some support from the language of the rule itself and
its legislative history. The rule states that a "knowing
violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of
court."'54 Judge Tjoflat emphasized that the rule speaks of
intent ("knowing") and punishment ("punished"), both terms of
criminal law.'55 Additionally, the congressional record ac-
companying the 1977 amendments to Rule 6 stresses that
violators of the rule would be "subject to the penalty of
150. See supra text accompanying notes 131-35.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
152. See supra text accompanying note 140.
153. See Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
154. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
155. United States v. Blalock, 844 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1988) (Tjoflat, J.,
concurring).
WINTER 1992] Contempt Sanctions and Press Leaks
contempt."' 56 The use of "penalty" expresses the congres-
sional desire for the contempt to be treated as criminal.'57
Finally, the common practice of courts prior to the inclusion of
contempt actions in Rule 6(e)(2) was to apply criminal con-
tempt punishments as a response to a grand jury leak. 5 8 By
providing for a contempt action for violations of Rule 6(e)(2),
Congress arguably approved the established practice. 5 9
Further analysis uncovers some ambiguity in the rule,
however. As Judge Edwards noted, the rule itself does not
limit the response to a contempt violation to criminal
action. 6 ° A similar failure to specify either criminal or civil
contempt occurs in Rule 6(e)(5), which permits closed con-
tempt hearings; it appears the drafters intended that general
reference to include both civil and criminal actions.161  It
follows, then, that the general reference to contempt in
Rule 6(e)(2) also implies both actions. Had the drafters
intended only criminal contempt, they could have expressly
said so or included a cross-reference to Rule 42, which estab-
lishes criminal contempt procedures. Finally, although the
legislative history does refer to Rule 6(e)(2)'s contempt
sanction as punitive,162 both civil and criminal contempt
sanctions have punitive elements.'63 The simple reference
to punishment, therefore, is insufficient to determine whether
the contempt action should be considered criminal.
The practical and theoretical limitations of civil contempt
actions counsel against reading a requirement for them into
.the rule. It is more logical to infer that the drafters intended
the type of contempt sanction which correctly fits the leak
situation. 164
156. S. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 531.
157. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1556 (Tjoflat, J., concurring); see also In re Grand
Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188, 1199-1201 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (noting
that references in the legislative history to punitive intent behind the contempt
sanction authorized in the rule indicate that criminal, not civil, contempt was
contemplated).
158. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1556-57; see also Lester B. Orfield, The Federal
Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 400, 448 (1959).
159. Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1558.
160. Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1324 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
161. The advisory committee's note refers to both civil and criminal contempt in
relation to Rule 6(e)(5). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(5) advisory committee's note.
162. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 53-64.
164. Although criminal contempt sanctions appear to fit the grand jury leak
situation far better than civil contempt sanctions, it should be noted that there are
534 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:2
IV. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT ACTIONS:
A SUGGESTED METHOD
My research has not revealed a federal court which has yet
initiated criminal contempt proceedings in response to a leak
of grand jury information. Federal courts outside the District
of Columbia, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, however, are still
free to do so, not being bound by the Lance65 court's charac-
terization of such contempt actions as civil. Should a court
agree with this Note that criminal contempt sanctions are the
proper remedy, it may wonder what procedures will best
facilitate an investigation and resolution of the Rule 6(e)(2)
violation. This Part presents some guidelines for initiating
and conducting criminal contempt actions in response to leaks.
A. The Initial Threshold: Proving the Leak
In order for a court to initiate criminal contempt proceed-
ings, it must first be convinced that a leak has occurred.
Unlike some acts of criminal contempt which take place in the
presence of the judge, 6 ' the court will not be aware of leaks
when they happen. The target will therefore need to present
the court with initial evidence of a leak. As is the case with
civil contempt proceedings following a leak, newspaper articles
additional non-legal and unstated reasons why an appellate court might prefer to
term the contempt sanction "civil." From a purely pragmatic standpoint, an appellate
court may desire to hear a particular case because it believes that the underlying
issue is important or that the district court may have erred. A denial of a motion for
criminal contempt sanctions is not appealable, but a denial of a motion for civil
contempt sanctions is. Compare supra text accompanying notes 123-30 (civil
contempt actions and the right to appeal) with infra text accompanying notes 180-81
(criminal contempt actions and the right to appeal). If the Barry and Lance courts
had characterized the contempt actions as criminal, then they would have remanded
to the district courts to reconsider the matters as criminal actions. The district
courts probably would have refused to impose criminal contempt sanctions, just as
they had refused to impose civil remedies, and the targets would have been unable
to seek another interlocutory review by the appellate court. If an appellate court
believes that government actions and leaks deserve some reprimand not issued by the
district court, they may rely on the right to appeal a denied motion for civil contempt
sanctions even though a civil action is itself improper.
165. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance v. United States), 610 F.2d 202 (5th
Cir. 1980).
166. See 3 WRIGHT, supra note 67, §§ 707-08.
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and other press accounts will often be the only evidence of the
leak. Thus, the guidelines for reviewing news articles
presented in Lance should be followed at the initial stage of
pursuing criminal contempt sanctions as well." 7
B. Appointing the Special Prosecutor
The court should appoint a special prosecutor to investigate
the leak.'68 To avoid potential bias, this prosecutor should
not be connected with the U.S. Attorney's Office or the Justice
Department.'69 The only legal limitation on such an ap-
pointment, however, is that counsel for the opposing party to
the underlying dispute cannot prosecute the contempt.
70
How the Young rule applies to a grand jury case is unclear.
Certainly an indicted defendant's attorney could not be
appointed. A target's counsel, on the other hand, is not
officially counsel for an opposing party. He would bring the
violation to the court's attention as a member of the public,
not as a private party seeking civil contempt relief.
The Court's language in Young, however, does not leave
much room for the target's counsel to be appointed. The Court
stated that "[a] private attorney appointed to prosecute a
criminal contempt.., should be as disinterested as a public
prosecutor .... ,17' The target's counsel is not a wholly
disinterested party. Though his client will not benefit directly
from the contempt action, his interest in stopping the leaks
and seeing some action taken against the violator is probably
too great to satisfy Young.
172
167. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188, 1206-07
(E.D. Mich. 1990) (rejecting petitioner's motion for civil contempt relief, but still
employing the Lance court's methods for evaluating newspaper articles as evidence
of leaks). For a description of the Lance court's methods, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 77-100.
168. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) (permitting appointment of a special prosecutor).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 28-41 for a discussion of the problems of
appointing a 'prosecutor related to the U.S. Attorney's Office or Department of
Justice.
170. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 804 & n.15 (1987).
171. Id. at 804 (footnote omitted).
172. Target's counsel could argue that the "benefit" referred to in Young does not
apply to him. The Court stressed the financial and legal rewards to be gained by the
private prosecutor's client. In a criminal contempt action, the target receives no
damage reward, nor is a settlement possible between the parties; thus the two main
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To avoid possible bias in favor of either the prosecutor or the
target, therefore, the court should appoint a disinterested
private attorney. In a high-profile case like that of Mayor
Barry or Mayor Young, 7 3 the court should appoint a promi-
nent, well-respected member of the bar, who can inspire the
trust of the public and the parties and who will conduct a fair
investigation.
C. Investigating the Leak
Once the court appoints a disinterested private attorney,
that attorney possesses all the prosecutorial discretion of a
government prosecutor.'74 The special prosecutor then can
investigate the allegations, using subpoenas if necessary. The
special prosecutor may also request a Rule 6(e) disclosure of
matters occurring before the grand jury. 75  If the special
prosecutor establishes probable cause, he will notify the
suspected violator of the charge and the upcoming hearing by
an order to show cause.
176
D. Defendant's Rights
Once the defendant has been charged, the traditional
protections of criminal procedure attach, including the right to
a jury trial,7 7 and the "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" standard
concerns of the Young Court are not implicated. Id. at 805. Because the contempt
action is arguably separate from the underlying grand jury investigation, the target
could claim that he receives no benefit in the way the Court defined "benefit."
173. Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Mayor Barry); In re
Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (Mayor
Young).
174. See Young, 481 U.S. at 807. The attorney would also receive the salary of a
U.S. attorney. Id. at 806 n.17.
175. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i) permits the disclosure of matters occurring
before the grand jury "when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding. .. ."
176. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). It is apparently in the court's discretion whether or
not to require probable cause before notifying a possible contemnor of the action. See
3 WRIGHT, supra note 67, § 710 & n.14.
177. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198-200 (1968).
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of proof. 7 ' This heavy burden on the prosecutor will cer-
tainly mean that the mere evidence from newspaper articles
will be insufficient to sustain a conviction. Instead, state-
ments from officials who knew about the leaks may be the best
evidence to prove criminal contempt. In addition, the protec-
tion against self-incrimination would likely prevent the court
from imposing affidavit requirements on the defendant once
the criminal contempt proceeding has begun, and may render
questionable the admission of prior affidavits. 179 Thus, the
defendant would be protected against any compelled state-
ments required of him during the initial investigation of the
leak.
E. Right to Appeal
A criminal contempt acquittal cannot be appealed.8 ° Nor
can there be an appeal of either the judge's decision not to
appoint a prosecutor or the appointed prosecutor's decision not
to proceed or indict, as these decisions are within legitimate
prosecutorial discretion.' Of course, a conviction for crimi-
nal contempt is appealable by the defendant.
CONCLUSION
Contempt sanctions present the only viable response to a
leak of grand jury materials to the press. Although I have
found no cases where the prosecutor was actually held in
contempt, courts have strongly condemned possible leaks and
have established procedures to institute contempt remedies.
Courts, however, have incorrectly determined that the civil
contempt action applies to leak situations. The criminal
178. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911).
179. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination bars the admission
of compelled communications and testimony of the accused. See Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
180. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance v. United States), 610 F.2d 202,
221 (5th Cir. 1980) (Kravitch, J., dissenting); Berman, supra note 49, at 739.
181. See Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1561 (11th Cir. 1988) (Tjoflat,
J., concurring).
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contempt proceeding is in fact the superior form of action, both
functionally and conceptually. In spite of courts' reluctance to
employ criminal contempt proceedings against prosecutors,
Rule 6(e)(2) endorses the use of criminal contempt actions.
Criminal contempt proceedings provide adequate means,
particularly through the appointment of a special prosecutor,
to respond to leaks of grand jury information to the press.
Courts should, therefore, begin to assert their obligation to
respond to violations of Rule 6(e)(2) through criminal contempt
proceedings.
